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GAY POLITICS AND PRECEDENTS 
Frank B. Cross* 
GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW. By Daniel R. Pinello. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2003. Pp. xv, 349. Clo.th, $70; paper, $23. 
One can find many analyses of the development of gay rights law 
in America but none are so illuminating as Daniel Pinello's1 in his 
book Gay Rights and American Law. More significantly, while it offers 
a superb understanding of the recent record of gay rights litigation, the 
book provides a fine-grained and sophisticated understanding of 
judicial decisionmaking in this important and developing area of 
the law. Indeed, the value of the book for students of judicial 
decisionmaking even transcends its value for students of gay 
rights jurisprudence. 
Quantitative empirical studies of judicial decisionmaking, well 
established in political science, have steadily burgeoned in the legal 
literature. Such research is enormously important to understanding 
the law.2 Unfortunately, much of this research has been incomplete 
and too discipline-centered. Thus, economists empirically study the 
law from their own perspective without sufficient appreciation of the 
claims of law and political science, while political scientists too often 
fail to appreciate the importance of legal and economic 
considerations. The disciplines have much to learn from one another.3 
While legal researchers may have done less empirical work than those 
in other disciplines, and may have erred in the conduct of this 
research,4 they have been more integrative in this research and done a 
* Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs School of 
Business, University of Texas; Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. B.A. 1977, 
University of Kansas ; J.D. 1980, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York. 
2 See, e.g. , Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251 (1997). 
3. See, e.g. , Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 571-72 (2003) (contending that "law 
professors have a good deal to learn by paying more attention to what political scientists 
have been writing about courts," while "political scientists have something to learn by paying 
attention to what law professors perceive to be happening"). 
4. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) 
(contending that quantitative empirical legal research is deeply flawed). This claim is not 
uncontested and saw a series of responses. See, e.g. , Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A 
Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002); Jack Goldsmith & Adrian 
Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002); 
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much better job of illuminating the importance of law itself. Pinello 
is a political scientist but conducts his research with an insightful 
appreciation of the law that is often lacking in political 
science research. 
The context in which Pinello studies judicial decisionmaking is that 
of gay rights. His focus on this relatively narrow slice of the law helps 
us understand judicial decisionmaking more generally. First, as the 
focus narrows, one can better capture detailed variables that may be 
unavailable in a much broader context. Second, the narrower focus 
can show how the determinants of judicial decisionmaking are not 
uniform across the entire body of cases but may vary by case type. In 
the end, his book tells us a great deal about the development of gay 
rights law in America, much more than we can learn from a traditional 
analysis of cases and purely legal arguments. 
The book begins with "narratives" of some of the interesting gay 
rights decisions, but I will focus on the empirical analyses. The crux of 
the book is in this extensive empirical research, which I summarize 
and place in the context of prior analyses in Section One of this 
Review. Section Two addresses the practical implications of the 
empirical findings of Pinello and others on legal and public-policy 
matters of contemporary concern. In Section Three, I examine the 
book's findings in the context of the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Lawrence, striking down the Texas anti-sodomy statute. The fourth 
and final Section departs from gay rights to consider the broader 
implications of Pinello's research methods and findings on legal 
research. Legal academics have been unduly and unfortunately averse 
to empirical analyses, which may be critical to our research enterprise. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF GAY RIGHTS 
In his attempt to isolate the determinants of decisions advancing 
gay rights, Pinello conducts an empirical study of decisions on various 
gay rights topics. He analyzed 391 decisions, including 1439 separate 
votes by 849 appellate judges, over a thirty year period (p. 74). For 
each of these votes, Pinello coded numerous variables. He coded each 
case by type of issue and other factors such as amicus participation, 
coded each judge according to numerous individual characteristics, 
coded various institutional circumstances (such as court 
characteristics) and coded whether there was clear legal precedent 
governing the case. 
The gay rights issues considered by Pinello included as "essential" 
are family matters (such as adoption rights and rights of domestic 
Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 
(2002). 
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partners), sexual orientation discrimination in employment, gays in 
the military, the constitutionality and enforcement of laws 
criminalizing consensual sex practices, and free speech and free 
association rights of gays (p. 8). He also includes some cases he 
considered nonessential, such as defamation cases and same-sex sexual 
harassment. The family matters category contains the most cases in 
the database (p. 10). The book breaks down results for cumulative gay 
rights actions and for categories of case types. Pinello presents 
considerable detailed data on all his variables and correlations in 
extensive appendices (pp. 163-215). He also lists all the cases used in 
his study, giving considerable transparency to his analysis, and 
permitting the evaluation and replication of his research (pp. 167-213). 
The central aim of the book was to ascertain which factors Qudge, 
casetype, legal, etc.) best determined whether a case would yield an 
outcome favorable to gay rights. The book studies the effect of a 
substantial number of variables, which may be broken down into 
attitudinal factors (those involving the individual judge and her 
background), institutional factors (those involving judicial selection 
and surrounding institutions), and legal precedents that are supposed 
to be driving these decisions. Pinello found all these factors to be of 
some importance, in varying degrees, as discussed below. 
A. Attitudinal Factors 
Attitudinal factors are the individualized characteristics of the 
particular judge. These have sometimes been referred to as the 
"background" of the judge.5 The background factors that may affect 
judicial decisions are the manifold influences that enter into every 
person's makeup. They include all the genetic and environmental 
factors that may influence a person. Empirical research has 
consistently confirmed that individual judicial attitudes are a key 
determinant of judicial decisions.6 While judges profess fealty to the 
law, they have at times conceded that their decisions are influenced by 
attitudinal background factors.7 The most significant attitudinal factors 
addressed in Gay Rights and American Law are religion, ethnicity and 
gender, political party affiliation, and cultural environment. 
5. See James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
149, 153 (2003) (analyzing studies on judicial background). 
6. See James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in 
the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 10 (1983) (reviewing extensive tradition of 
research suggesting that decisions "flow from judges' attitudes" rather than from 
"precedents, statutes, and constitutions"). 
7. See, e.g. , Stephen G. Breyer, The Work of The Supreme Court, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS 
& SCI., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 47 (observing that a judge "cannot escape one's own training or 
background"). 
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1. Religion 
In the earlier days of empirical research on judicial 
decisionmaking, it was believed that such a fundamental background 
factor as religion would play some role in decisions.8 Religion appears 
to play a role in voting for political offices. Establishing the strength of 
this connection for judicial decisions proved elusive for some time, 
however.9 There is some evidence that a judge's religion influences his 
decisions in some types of cases, though,10 and Pinello builds on this 
with his study of gay rights decisions. His findings on religion are 
possibly the most controversial in the book.11 
The pattern of voting by judges of different religions is fairly stark. 
Jewish judges were by far the most likely to cast pro-gay rights votes 
(68.5% in all cases and over 71 % in family cases) (p. 88). This is a 
greater success rate than for judges who subscribe to no religion (66% 
and 55% respectively). Catholics were the least likely (under 45% in 
all cases and only 43% in family cases). In prior research that found 
some religious difference in judicial voting, Catholic judges have 
been more liberal, so the gay rights context may be a unique context 
(pp. 88-89). 
When Pinello sought to break out the Protestant dominations that 
might be considered fundamentalist, he found some difference. 52% 
of the fundamentalist votes were against gay rights claims, while 45% 
of the votes of other Protestants were against gay rights claims (p. 89). 
This difference is not a dramatic one and perhaps a little surprising, as 
it seems that fundamentalist protestants were reasonably open to gay 
rights claims. In short, religious background clearly seems to matter in 
judicial decisionmaking, though not in a clear or simplistic manner. 
Religion does not appear to drive judicial decisions on gay rights but 
exerts some influence at the margins, depending upon the type of case 
and particular religious philosophy. 
Pinello himself cautions against oversubscribing to his results, 
noting that "some Catholic judges such as William Brennan, Jr., 
8. For a review of some of the early research on judicial backgrounds and decisions, see 
Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. POL. 
334 (1967). 
9. See, e.g. , JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT ANO 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 231-34 (1993) (reporting that the empirical evidence provided 
little evidence for an effect for any social background variable on judicial decisionmaking). 
10. See Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The 
Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507 (1999) 
(finding that Christian evangelicals rendered more conservative decisions in cases involving 
the death penalty, obscenity, and gender discrimination). 
1 1. See infra text accompanying notes 153-167(discussing the controversy that Pinello's 
efforts to study the effect of religion roused among law professors). 
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supported gay rights, and some African Americans such as Clarence 
Thomas did not." (p. 100). His results ·can support only a probabilistic 
judgment about the effects of a particular background on judicial 
decisions. The data clearly demonstrate that a judge's religious 
background does matter somewhat, though, in how he or she will vote 
on gay rights claims, and in a fairly consistent predictable way. 
2. Ethnicity/Gender 
Another background factor that might be expected to influence 
judicial decisions is the judge's ethnicity or gender. Ethnicity and 
gender have some correlation with political attitudes and voting, but 
empirical studies of their effects on judicial decisionmaking have been 
mixed.12 One review and analysis of the research concluded that 
"empirical studies show only slight, if any, differences between the 
overall voting behavior of male and female judges along the 
dimension of gender."13 Indeed, most female judges dispute that their 
gender makes any difference in their decisions.14 
Pinello tested the hypothesis that ethnicity and gender could make 
a difference in judicial voting patterns on gay rights cases. He found 
that minority judges (operationalized as African Americans, Latinos, 
and Latinas) were about twenty percent more likely to vote in favor of 
gay rights claims than their majority counterparts (p. 78). Gender also 
had a significant association with the judge votes on gay rights. 
Women were twelve percent more likely to vote for such rights on all 
the essential claims and twenty-seven percent more likely on cases 
involving child custody, visitation, adoption, and foster care (p. 88). 
This aspect of the judicial background seemingly had an effect on how 
judges ruled. 
Ethnicity and gender did not have an across-the-board association 
with decisions. For example, neither was significant in decisions 
involving a federal constitutional issue (p. 279). Nor were these 
12. See Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 
JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1993) (describing empirical research on decisionmaking by women 
judges as "mixed"); John Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of 
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 
JUDICATURE 164, 171-73 (1983) (finding no material gender- or race-based differences 
among Carter's appointees); Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White 
Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 LAW. & SOC'Y REV. 1197 (1990) (finding 
little racial difference in judicial sentencing determinations). 
13. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 
891, 898 (1995); see also Gibson, supra note 6, at 24 (suggesting that research shows little 
effect of gender and ethnicity on judicial voting). 
14. See Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, Women on the Federal Bench, 73 B.U. L. REV. 
39, 44 (1993) (relaying a report by a federal district judge that gender does not influence her 
decision); Solimine & Wheatley, supra note 13, at 905 (noting that female judges dispute any 
notions of feminist judging). 
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variables statistically significant in federal court decisions (p. 290). 
Nevertheless, there was sufficient difference based on ethnicity and 
gender to demonstrate an effect for diversity in the composition of a 
judiciary. The course of the law will be different, depending on the 
degree to which the judiciary is diversified by gender and ethnicity. 
While cultural environment, discussed below, probably has an impact 
on both gay rights claims and on judicial diversity, the variables for 
ethnicity and gender had significance even over and above the effects 
of cultural environment. 
3. Political Party 
By far, political party is the clearest attitudinal determinant of 
judicial decisionmaking identified in prior studies, considered a proxy 
of ideology on a liberal to conservative spectrum.15 This attitudinal 
variable has consistently appeared as significant in empirical studies 
that analyze judicial decisionmaking.16 One survey of the research 
concluded that "only political party affiliation seems to have any 
significant and consistent capacity to explain and predict the outcome 
of judicial decisions."17 While judicial voting is not seen as partisan, in 
the sense of party loyalty, the consistence of party affiliation as a 
determinant of judicial outcomes is ascribed to the ideological 
preferences associated with the Democrat or Republican parties. 
In contrast to the great bulk of preexisting research, Pinello did not 
find a statistically significant effect for party affiliation by itself in his 
results (p. 276). The party effects did show up, though, when party was 
combined with other variables. This is captured through what is 
known as an interaction variable. Such a variable is created by 
multiplying the values for two variables and then entering that sum as 
its own separate variable. When this was done, Pinello found a 
statistically significant effect for the combination of party and his 
measure of the state's cultural environment (p. 276). This suggests 
that, at the state court level of judges, many Democrats come from 
conservative states and that they vote conservatively on gay rights 
issues. In states where the cultural environment is more amenable to 
gay rights claims, Democrats tend to be more responsive to gay rights 
claims than Republicans. Similarly, the association of party affiliation 
and the length of the judicial term was significant, suggesting that 
15. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1543 n.75 (2000) (discussing use of this proxy). 
16. See, e.g., Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A 
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999) (reviewing and combining numerous studies and 
finding consistent and substantial effect of party affiliation).  
17.  ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 142 (2d ed. 1991). 
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some Democratic state judges may vote against gay rights for 
electoral concerns. 
In contrast to the overall results, the effect of political party is very 
pronounced at the federal level. Pinello finds that "federal judges 
selected by Democratic presidents, compared with Republican 
appointees, positively determined an astonishing 40.5% of the 
probability 'space' between complete success and utter failure of 
lesbian and gay rights claims in federal appellate courts."(p. 151). 
Thus, the party effect was much greater in the federal courts, as has 
been found in much of the prior research that has involved federal 
courts. The politicization of federal court rulings may be due to the 
greater independence of those courts. Political scientists have 
suggested that "federal judges, because they have life tenure, may 
even be more ideological than are legislators or executives."18 Pinello's 
findings lend some credence to that claim. 
4. Cultural Environment 
Among other background factors is the cultural environment in 
which a judge lives. Cultural environment is a vague term, but it may 
be captured geographically and amplify the effects of party affiliation. 
It is well known that a Northeastern Republican will generally be 
more liberal than her Southern counterpart and possibly more liberal 
than even a Southern Democrat.19 The "red states" that voted for 
George W. Bush are often regarded as culturally different from the 
"blue states" that voted for John Kerry. Just as party affiliation may 
attitudinally determine some judicial decisions, so might the different 
geographical cultural environments of judges.20 Some prior research 
has found a significant geographic effect on judicial votes.21 
Pinello found a significant association between cultural 
environment and outcomes. Indeed, there are some remarkable 
18. Cross, supra note 2, at 279. 
19. For a quantitative summary of this effect, see Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind 
of "Republican Moment" in Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1016-17 (2003). 
Lazarus reviews congressional voting on environmental issues from 1970-2000, and the 
numbers show dramatic regional differences that in some cases transcend even partisan 
differences. Id. 
20. Cultural environment may not be a true "background" factor, as it was measured by 
the current location of the judge, not the place where the judge was born or grew up. 
Nevertheless, one might expect one's current cultural environment to shape one's attitudes, 
so it is included in this Section as an attitudinal variable. 
21. See Gibson, supra note 6, at 31 (discussing research showing that "courts' policy 
outputs are sensitive to their environments"); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time 
Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting 
Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 473-74 (1991) (reporting that Supreme Court 
justices' southern origins and rural origins had a significant negative effect on votes for civil 
rights and civil liberties). 
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disparities among states in the success rates of gay rights claims. In 
Missouri, gay rights claims had only a 9% success rate, while in 
Massachusetts they succeeded 78% of the time. Not every state was as 
predictable, though: gay rights claims had a significant 56% success 
rate in Texas (higher than New York's 52%) (p. 12). The number of 
decisions per state was not consistently high, though, and Pinello 
broke the data into regions so that it could be more confidently 
analyzed for the effects o cultural environment. 
The overall results for cultural environment showed it to be a 
"highly predictive" variable for outcomes on gay rights claims (p. 92). 
Pinello concluded that location was a central factor in the outcome of 
cases, with particular states in the South and Midwest being about fifty 
percent less favorable to gay parents (p. 144). The presence of a state 
statute banning consensual sodomy had significance even over and 
above the regional variables. This suggests that the regional variables 
might not have fully captured the effects of cultural environment 
(being imperfect proxies), so that even the substantial effect for 
regional cultural environment could understate the effect of this 
variable on outcomes of gay rights cases. 
The evidence that individual attitudinal factors influence the 
decisions of judges is clear. Pinello's data confirms this fact and adds 
new information about the role of attitudinal variables in gay rights 
cases at the federal and state levels. Pinello, however, did not test for 
the influence of the attitudes of other judges on the panel. This "peer 
effect" has a significant effect on outcomes. Appellate judges have 
emphasized that they are strongly influenced by other members of 
their panels.22 Some significant empirical results confirm that the 
decisions of federal circuit judges are affected by the ideological 
attitudes of other members of their appellate panel, in addition to 
their own attitudes.23 For example, Republican judges will moderate 
their conservatism when sharing a panel with a Democrat. Another 
study finds that racial diversity on a circuit court panel changed the 
voting behavior of other judges on the panel.24 Pinello did not attempt 
to identify this effect, which could have a substantial effect on voting. 
22 See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision 
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003). 
23. See Frank B. Cross & Emeron H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168-
73 (1998) (finding that panels with representatives from both parties are more moderate and 
panels with representatives from a single party are more ideological in their results); Richard 
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 
1751-58(1997) (reporting effects of other panel members on judicial decisions). 
24. See Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision­
Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971-1999 
(March 30, 2003), at http://www.yale.edu/coic/CameronCummings.pdf. 
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This effect could mean that he understated the importance of judicial 
diversity for judicial decisions. 
B. Institutional Factors 
Beyond individual attitudinal predispositions, judicial decisions 
may be influenced by a judge's institutional setting.25 Some of Pinello's 
most interesting findings came in his research on the effect of 
institutional factors on judicial gay rights decisions. While judicial 
background was clearly a significant factor in such decisions, the 
judicial background predispositions were substantially affected by the 
institutional environment in which they operated. The institutional 
factors on which he focused were: the different state methods for 
judicial selection, the choice between the federal and state courts as 
fora for gay rights claims, and the external role of gay rights interest 
groups on outcomes. 
1. State Selection Methods 
Pinello tested whether the different state methods for judicial 
selection have a significant effect on the outcome of gay rights claims. 
The states use a wide range of methods for the selection and retention 
of judges. These include selection by partisan election, nonpartisan 
election, selection by gubernatorial appointment, selection by 
legislative appointment, or selection with a system called "merit 
selection," in which a lawyers' group screens nominees.26 Within each 
system of selection, states provide for different judicial terms and 
many states in which judges are initially appointed require them to run 
in retention elections.27 The state's system of judicial selection could 
logically influence judicial decisions, and the diversity of these systems 
offer a valuable context for research. 
Much of the existing research on state judicial selection methods 
has not shown a substantial effect from different methods.28 A few 
25. Psychological research indicates that individual attitudinal preferences are 
moderated by surrounding context. See, e.g. , Gibson, supra note 6, at 10-11 (reviewing this 
research). 
26. See Robert A. Carp & Ronald Stidham, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 258 (3d ed. 
1996) (categorizing state selection systems). The authoritative source for details on state 
judicial selection is AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE 
STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2000) . 
27. Eighty-seven percent of all state judges must at some time "stand for some form of 
election." Roy Schotland, Judicial Campaign Finance Could Work, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 
1998, at A21. 
28. See, e.g., Jerome O'Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit Plan, 14 JUST. SYS. J .  477 
(1991) (reviewing literature showing little effect and presenting study of sentencing decisions 
confirming absence of significant effect). 
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studies have found at least some apparent effect from selection 
method, and they have generally concluded that elected judges are 
more activist than appointed judges.29 One recent test discovered that 
merit-plan judges were less likely to hold statutes unconstitutional, 
while elected judges were somewhat more likely to do so.30 Elected 
judiciaries also produce more dissents,31 which might be a proxy for 
activism. However, there is also evidence that appointed judges were 
more receptive to sex discrimination claims than those who were 
elected.32 A study of public-utility regulation found that appointed 
courts were more likely to side with consumers in disputes, while 
elected judges were more likely to side with regulated firms and large 
commercial customers. 33 The extant empirical research does 
not confirm any clear theories about the effects of judicial 
selection systems. 
One might hypothesize that elected judges would be relatively less 
sympathetic to the rights claims of a fairly small minority of the 
population, such as gays. Chief Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court asks: "How can elected judges remain impartial and 
rule on minority interests when they depend on the majority of the 
electorate to stay in office?"34 Under the circumstances, majoritarian 
elected judges might be expected to disfavor gay rights. The data in 
this study did not bear out this hypothesis, however. Elected judges 
were somewhat more likely to vote for gay rights claims than were 
appointed judges (p. 91). 
Pinello's results on state selection methods do not present a clear 
picture of their institutional effect. While appointed judges in general 
were more likely to oppose gay rights claims, the interaction variable 
of appointed judges and cultural environment and term in office were 
positive. Thus, appointed judges in a cultural environment favorable 
to gay rights claims were more activist in support of those claims. 
Moreover, while elected judges tended to be more positive to gay 
29. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-lnstitutionalism and Dissent in State 
Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54 (1990); James P. Wenzel et al., Legislating from the State 
Bench: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Activism, 25 AM. POL. Q. 363 (1997). 
30. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 195, 215-16 (2003). 
31. See Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Order in the Courts: A Neo-lnstitutional 
Approach to Judicial Consensus, 42 W. POL. Q. 391 (1989). 
32. See Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex 
Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986). 
33. F. Andrew Hanssen, Appointed Courts, Elected Courts, and Public Utility 
Regulation: Judicial Independence and the Energy Crisis, 1 Bus. & POL. 179 (1999). 
34. The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and 
Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9 (2003). 
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rights, judges with longer terms of office also were more positive (pp. 
91-92). The positive results for elected judges suggest that electoral 
accountability may favor gay rights claims, but the positive results for 
term length suggest the contrary. Consequently, it is difficult to 
understand the implications of this finding, which does not resolve the 
division in the preexisting research. The results of this study do at least 
suggest that electoral accountability is not a strong negative factor in 
gay rights decisions. 
2. State vs. Federal 
There is a generalized preference for the federal courts in 
individual rights or civil rights litigation, including gay rights 
litigation.35 A few years back, an article suggested that in gay rights 
claims, the state forum was the more favorable one.36 This article was 
largely impressionistic, though. Pinello's empirical results provide 
strong confirmation of its conclusions and demonstrate that during the 
time period studied, gay rights claims were more successful when 
brought in state court. 
Gay Rights and American Law devotes much of its analysis to 
addressing the differences between the federal and state fora. The 
book's comparison of federal and state courts controlled for a variety 
of variables, including the nature of the claim (under federal or state 
constitutions) and the other variables discussed above. Pinello found a 
clear difference in the receptivity of state and federal courts to gay 
rights claims. The coefficient for claims heard in federal court was 
negative and statistically significant. Its overall impact was a negative 
thirty percent probability of success (p. 275). State courts decided in 
favor of gay rights more than twice as often as did federal courts, at 
both the intermediate and supreme court levels {p. 1 1 1). Moreover, 
claims brought under state constitutions were resolved more favorably 
than federal constitutional claims.37 
Significantly, the federal context also muted the effect of many of 
the background variables. Gender and ethnicity were not significant, 
age lost significance, cultural environment had no significance, and the 
Jewish religion variable lost significance (though Catholic religion 
remained statistically significant and negative) {p. 290-91). Most 
dramatically, the variables for negative and positive precedent also 
lost statistical significance in the federal court context (p. 290). The 
35. See infra.text accompanying notes 106-114. 
36. See William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 
(1999) . 
37. P. 1 1 1. Federal constitutional claims increased the probability that a gay rights claim 
would lose by nineteen percent. P. 112. 
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author found that "any federal court decision was likely to be 
predisposed against gay rights" (p. 97; emphasis omitted). 
3. Interest Groups 
Pinello also considered the effect of organized interest groups 
promoting gay rights. One would expect to see some effect from their 
participation, since interest groups presumably wouldn't spend the 
time and money to engage in litigation if they did not believe their 
participation offered some benefit. Interest groups such as the 
NAACP and ACLU have participated vigorously in litigation and are 
involved in a majority of important constitutional cases.38 David 
Truman's political classic The Governmental Process emphasized that 
"[t]he activities of the judicial officers of the United States are not 
exempt from the processes of group politics," so "few organized 
groups can afford to be indifferent to its activities."39 Groups obviously 
perceive this importance and participate in litigation accordingly.40 
The power of interest groups is somewhat disputed, though, with some 
research showing little effect.41 An examination of the role of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund concluded that there was no evidence 
demonstrating that it significantly influenced judicial decisions.42 
Although the empirical evidence on the role of interest groups in 
court is not conclusive, there is reason to think that strategic 
participation by interest groups could have an effect on the path of the 
law. Such groups have a broader perspective and interest in the state 
of the overall law, as opposed to the direct parties to litigation, who 
may be centrally interested in the outcome of a particular case. 
38. See Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, The Role of Interest Groups in Supreme Court 
Policy Formation, in 2 PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION 63 (Robert Eyestone ed., 1984) 
(reporting on role of interest groups and finding that of 322 important constitutional cases, a 
majority were sponsored by interest groups and most of the remaining cases had interest 
group participation as amici). 
39. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 479 (2d. ed. 1971). 
40. See, e.g., Susan M. Olson, Interest-Group Litigation in Federal District Court: Beyond 
the Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. POL. 854 (1990) (summarizing evidence and survey 
on interest group participation in court). 
41. See, e.g. , Lee Epstein & C.K. Rowland, Debunking the Myth of Interest Group 
Invincibility in the Courts, 85 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 205 (1991) (reporting study finding no 
effect from interest group participation before district courts). 
42. See Steven C. Tauber, The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the U.S. Supreme 
Court's Racial Discrimination Decision Making, 80 Soc. SCI. Q. 325, 327 (1999) (contending 
that "case studies do not demonstrate systematically that an interest group influences 
judicial decision making about the totality of a legal issue"). 
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Interest groups are able to use selective strategic litigation to produce 
precedents favorable to their constituents.43 
In addition to the strategic coordination of litigation, one might 
also expect interest groups to contribute to the success of gay rights 
claims, merely through their greater resources committed to strategic 
litigation. Some gay rights plaintiffs may lack the funds or legal 
representation required to present their case to a court in the best 
light. Backing from an interest group can provide those funds and that 
representation. It seems likely that a case's success could hinge at least 
in part on the strength of the legal claims presented to the court, in 
which case interest group support could make a difference. 
Pinello considered whether the role of gay rights interest groups 
made a difference in the outcome of litigation and found some 
evidence that such groups had a positive association with outcomes. 
The participation of a gay rights interest group in the case increased 
the probability of a pro-gay rights ruling by nearly 8% overall and by 
over 15% in decisions by courts of last resort, after controlling for 
other variables (p. 78, 80). Pinello concluded that interest groups 
played a vital role such that gays would be "wise to support the worthy 
efforts of these diligent organizations" (p. 150). 
The role of interest groups requires further exploration, and it 
would be premature to conclude from Pinello's data that such 
participation materially enhances the probability of success for gay 
rights claims. When interest groups participated, such claims were 
more likely to succeed, but that may not be due to the interest group 
participation. For example, it is possible that interest groups simply 
were wise enough to involve themselves in gay rights claims that were 
relatively strong on the merits (a selection effect), and this explanation 
could also explain Pinello's results. Such groups have a self-interested 
reason to associate themselves with successful litigation in order to 
please their membership. Given the theoretical reasons to believe that 
interest group participation should matter, though, and Pinello's 
empirical support for the value of such groups, it seems fair to 
conclude tentatively that their role in litigation matters to 
some degree. 
C. Legal Precedent 
In some respects, the most significant aspect of Pinello's book is his 
analysis of the importance of legal precedents. Prior empirical 
analyses have given relatively short shrift to the role that legal 
variables - such as precedent - may have in determining judicial 
43. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 
365-68 (1999) (discussing the ability of interest groups to use these tactics and influence the 
law). 
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decisions. Some have called the belief in the controlling power of 
precedent "a low form of rational behavior" analogous to 
"necromancy."44 One view held by some political scientists is that 
"rules based on precedent were little more than smokescreens behind 
which judges hide their values."45 An empirical test at the Supreme 
Court suggested that individual justices give relatively little heed 
to the power of their prior decisions.46 Yet precedents are 
supposed to influence decisions and judges claim that precedents 
determine decisions.47 
Judges typically testify as to the importance of legal precedent, 
within their opinions and without.48 Surveys of judges find that the law 
is central to decisions.49 Some empirical research suggests that reliance 
upon precedents may in fact play a significant role in decisions. Most 
of the research involves the vertical application of precedent and 
whether higher court principals can effectively control the outcomes in 
lower courts (pp. 119-22). Studies of lower courts have found 
that they appear to respond to the precedential directives of the 
Supreme Court.50 
Recent empirical evidence also suggests a role for horizontal 
precedent. Some intriguing recent research identifies certain 
"jurisprudential regimes" adopted by the Supreme Court that appear 
to have structured subsequent decisions even by the Court itself, 
44. Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the 
"Legal Model" of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 470 (2001) 
(quoting HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION AND 
PREDICTION 64 (1979)). At the Supreme Court level, at least, "it is widely considered a 
settled social scientific fact that law has almost no influence on the justices." Id. at 466. 
45. Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
783, 787 (2003). 
46. HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: 
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) (finding that if justices 
dissented in a case, they did not subsequently defer to the Court majority but continued to 
dissent in subsequent related cases). 
47. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1457 (2003). 
48. See, e.g. , Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The 
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 205 (1984) (reporting that the law 
"exerts a profoundly restrictive effect upon the outcome of most legal confrontations"). 
49. See, e.g. , DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS 21 (2002) (reporting that circuit court judges consistently report that reaching 
"legally correct" decisions is important or very important). 
50. See Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the 
Study of Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Ser. 
963 (1992) (finding an effect from Supreme Court obscenity decisions); Donald R. Songer & 
Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and 
New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990) (finding 
effect from the Miranda decision). 
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indicating that the rationale of an opinion influences future votes.51 
Another study found evidence that circuit courts heeded new legal 
rules established by other circuits.52 Intra-circuit district court 
precedents have been found influential in subsequent decisions.53 This 
research suggests that precedents may matter, at least in major 
Supreme Court cases, but the studies have yet to capture the routine 
use of precedent by courts. 
The studies mentioned above have only scratched the surface of 
necessary quantitative empirical analysis of law, however. The legal 
precedent variable is a notoriously difficult one to capture in 
quantitative empirical research.54 Yet efforts to capture the variable 
are important, as "[t]he lack of empirical support is the greatest 
shortcoming for those who believe in the legal model" of judicial 
decisionmaking.55 Pinello, by focusing on the context of gay rights 
decisions, has been able to capture an effect for legal precedent and 
enhance the understanding offered by the prior research. 
Pinello first identified clear precedents on gay rights (either 
positive and negative) that come from either the same court making 
the decision studied or from a higher court within the same judicial 
hierarchy. His coding for precedent was a demanding one and limited 
to precedents that might be considered "on point."56 Prior to 1970, 
there were very few precedents addressing gay rights, and those that 
existed were almost uniformly negative (pp. 128-29). Consequently his 
study period captures virtually the entire evolution of gay rights law. 
Given the paucity of historic doctrine, many of the decisions he 
studied were largely precedent-free, especially the earlier decisions.57 
As the law developed, though, some courts had available clear 
51. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002). 
52 See KLEIN, supra note 49, at 73-76 (finding an effect in areas of antitrust, search and 
seizure, and environmental law). 
53. See Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L.  REV. 1377, 1433 tbl.4 (1998) (reporting 
significant effect of such precedents). 
54. See, e.g. , Decisionmaking on the United States Courts of Appeals, supra note 47 
(observing that "empirically testing the legal model of decisionmaking is a daunting 
challenge"). 
55. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1443 (2001). 
56. P. 301. To be coded as governed by a prior precedent required that it involved gay 
rights and that it involved the specific field of the case (e.g. child custody, sodomy statute, 
etc.). Thus, he did not include generalized precedents that might support a gay rights claim 
(such as sexual privacy precedents) or gay rights precedents that involved a different case 
type as governing precedents. 
57. Of course, no legal decision ever appears to be entirely precedent-free, insofar as 
some analogous result may be cited. Pinello's operationalization of precedent measured the 
effects of an on-point precedent. 
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precedent on the gay rights issue of concern. Pinello conducted several 
separate tests on the role of these precedents on judicial voting. 
First, the book reports a standard regression of precedent along 
with his other attitudinal and institutional independent variables. 
Precedent played a relatively consistent role in predicting decisions 
and appeared to determine around a quarter to a third of the judicial 
votes. Of all the types of variables considered in all types of cases and 
court levels, positive precedent was the "most consistently 
consequential variable" (p. 86). Negative precedent also mattered and 
was statistically significant, though its overall impact was not so great. 
In a second test of precedent, Pinello used his other variables to 
construct a probabilistic measure for the success of gay rights claims 
for a given judge, based on predictons from those variables. He then 
divided these probabilistic predictions into three sectors - those 
predicting less than a one-third probability of success, those predicting 
a one-third to two-thirds probability of success, and those predicting a 
greater than two-thirds probability. Having done so, Pinello then 
introduced precedents to see how they affected the results in a large 
table of frequency distributions. These results were most revealing. 
For example, take the set of judges with a predicted probability of 
success of less than thirty-three percent, labeled conservatives. When 
there was no precedent, these judges voted against gay rights claims 
nearly eighty percent of the time, and favored them around twenty 
percent, as predicted. When there was a negative precedent, 
confirming their predispositions, the conservative judges again voted 
against the gay rights claims about eighty percent of the time. 
However, in the presence of a positive precedent, the conservative 
judges voted against the gay rights claim only one-third of the time 
and voted for the claim two thirds of the time. Judges who 
attitudinally were negative toward gay rights claims, such as Catholics, 
became likely to vote in favor of such claims in the presence of a 
strong precedent.58 Roughly comparable results were found for 
liberal judges, though they showed somewhat less effect for 
negative precedent. 
This test directly models precedents in operation. In the typical 
case, you have judges who are predisposed, to some degree, to favor 
one party or the other, absent any legal constraints. The key issue is 
the degree to which legal constraints such as precedent cause judges to 
modify their decisions. Pinello found a clear effect of precedent 
frequently overriding attitudinal and institutional preferences. The 
effect was not a universal one, as some judges apparently ignored 
58. See p. 151 (noting that Catholic judges voted nearly seventy percent of the time in 
favor of gay rights claims in the presence of a positive precedent). 
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precedent, but precedent nevertheless had a very substantial 
effect on outcomes. 
Pinello conducted yet a third test in which he examined the votes 
of judges that appeared to ignore precedents (whom he labeled the 
"precedential atheists") (pp. 138-40). In this test, he examined 
whether the precedents in question were vertical or horizontal. This 
study produced the interesting result that conservative judges were 
more deferential to vertical precedent than horizontal precedent, but 
liberal judges actually deferred more to horizontal anti-gay rights 
precedents. These results varied by case area, though, and the number 
of votes in the database was small, so it is not clear that they 
are salient. 
As the legal model would predict, precedent mattered more to 
intermediate appellate courts, and courts of last resort were more 
likely to make new precedents (p. 79). The role of legal variables was 
the most significant determinant for intermediate courts, but was not 
as great in supreme courts (p. 82). Overall, the results confirmed the 
theory that stare decisis was a powerful force in explaining the judicial 
decisions and in roughly the way predicted by the legal model (e.g. , 
less powerful for courts of last resort). Pinello reported that his results 
reflected "the high courts' greater policy-making role and their 
resultant propensity to follow attitudinal, environmental and 
institutional forces more than legal ones" (p. 141). 
While both negative and positive precedent had a statistically 
significant impact on outcomes, they were not equal in power. With 
controls for other attitudinal and institutional variables in his full 
sample of cases, Pinello found that the presence of a negative 
precedent reduced the probability of a subsequent pro-gay rights by 
around ten percent, but the presence of a positive precedent increased 
the probability of a subsequent pro-gay rights decision by thirty-six 
percent (p. 275). For decisions by courts of last resort (typically state 
supreme courts), the result was more remarkable - a positive 
precedent increased the likelihood of a pro-gay rights ruling by 34%, 
while a negative precedent also increased the likelihood of a pro-gay 
rights ruling, by around 18% (p. 80).59 In cases involving federal 
constitutional claims, precedent had a somewhat greater effect, for 
both negative and positive precedents.60 
59. This apparently aberrant finding might be due to the fact that supreme courts often 
have docket control and are empowered to reverse precedent. Thus, courts may have taken 
cases in the presence of a negative precedent specifically for the purpose of reversing that 
precedent. Consequently, the finding may reflect a selection effect rather than a true inverse 
effect of negative precedent on judicial decisions. 
60. P. 278 (reporting that the effect for negative precedent in these cases was nearly 
twenty percent while the effect for positive precedents exceeded forty-five percent) .  
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At first glance, the findings about the greater power of positive 
precedents might seem to confirm some conservatives' worse fears 
about the judicial system - that activist liberal precedents breed 
activism, while contrary conservative precedents have only a weak 
countervailing effect, because conservative judges feel bound by stare 
decisis.61 Most of the general empirical data on judicial decisionmaking 
does not support this hypothesis; this research shows that conservative 
judges are no more restrained by precedent than are liberals.62 In some 
areas of the law, though, the same phenomenon is found. Some 
aspects of First Amendment law, such as the obscenity decisions, have 
witnessed a one-way ratchet in the direction of expanding rights, 
without countervailing conservative retrenchment. One can 
hypothesize several different reasons for these results in discrete legal 
areas, including (a) changing social mores that are followed by the 
courts,63 (b) the dynamics of a judiciary that is hesitant to pursue its 
preferences by creating a new precedent on a significant social policy 
but eager to pursue those preferences by following such a precedent, 
once set,64 ( c) a libertarian bias in favor of extending individual 
rights,65 or even (d) the expansion of judicial power.66 Understanding 
61. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 330-31 (1996) (discussing but not 
adopting this theory); Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The 
October 2000 Term, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 284 (2003) (arguing that this ratchet 
effect is occurring and the supposedly conservative Supreme Court is in fact adhering to 
liberal precedents). 
62. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Robert M. Howard, How Supreme Court Justices Respond to 
Litigant Requests to Overturn Precedent, 85 JUDICATURE 148 (2001) (finding that 
conservative judges were as ready to overturn liberal precedents as vice versa); James F. 
Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, The U.S. Supreme Court's Incorporation and 
Interpretation of Precedent, 36 LAW & Soc'y REV. 139 (2002) (finding no ideological 
difference in whether prior precedents are interpreted positively or negatively). 
63. Pinello himself suggested that the difference "may be an artifact of improved public 
opinion on lesbian and gay issues." P. 138. 
64. While this is a fairly complex dynamic, I suspect it may be the best explanation for 
Pinello's discovery. Suppose that judges, like most elites, are amenable to gay rights, but as 
judges are hesitant to impose this preference on a society that may be unresponsive to it. 
Once a more activist judge "bites the bullet" and creates the precedent, that may shelter 
future judges from this fear, especially if the precedent does not in fact create public 
backlash. 
65. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling: How the Court, 
Congress, and the States Multiply Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1562-63 (1995) (arguing 
that judges, along with other institutions, serve to steadily expand individual rights). Once a 
liberty is granted, it may be more difficult for courts to take it away. 
66. When judges expand rights, they inevitably increase their role in society, because 
such rights are enforced by judicial vetoes on the actions of other institutions while a 
decision against individual rights is purely deferential to whatever institution allegedly 
infringes them. Compare this with a context such as affirmative action, where conservatives 
clearly have retrenched liberal precedents. Conservative decisions opposing affirmative 
action have as great an impact as those favoring judicial action. 
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which of these hypotheses (or which combination of them) explains 
the results would provide valuable information and represents an 
important topic for future research. 
Pinello's data on precedents contain one other very important 
finding, in that precedent had a much weaker impact on cases 
involving child custody, visitation, adoption, and foster care. In these 
cases, consideration of legal variables had less effect and improved the 
predictive ability of his model by less than four percent, while the 
effect of attitudinal variables was much greater than in other gay rights 
cases. He noted that these cases involved an amorphous "best interests 
of the child" standard, and inferred that such a standard meant that 
the law placed less constraint on decisionmaking, giving free play to 
the judges' attitudinal predispositions (p. 84). This finding supports the 
logical conclusion that the effect of precedent will depend upon its 
clarity and precision and gives some insight into the importance of 
precedential language. 
D. Other 
Pinello coded for the effect of a few other variables that did not 
readily fit into one of his three main categories. The case type clearly 
made a difference, as family issues were much less likely to be decided 
in favor of gay rights, as were claims regarding gays in the military (p. 
275). When the plaintiff was a gay male litigant, the claims were more 
likely to succeed than when the plaintiff was a lesbian. Older judges 
were more likely to rule against gay rights claims than were younger 
judges.67 The probability of a favorable gay rights decision also 
increased over time, during the decades studied. 
Pinello's results tell us much about judicial decisionmaking but 
leave us wanting still more. While he considered many variables, 
including some interaction variables, some of the most intriguing 
interactions were not tested. For example, we know that precedent 
could override substantial attitudinal predispositions to the contrary, 
but Pinello does not report the effects on most of the precise groups 
defined by other variables. For example, did precedent have a 
different power in appointed judiciaries than in elected ones? The use 
of multiple regression analysis serves to address the interactions 
among variables to some degree. Thus, because precedent and religion 
were variables in the same equation, we know that different religions 
reach different results, with the presence of precedents held constant. 
The methodology does not tell us, however, if the role of precedent 
67. P. 276. Prior research has found relatively little effect from judicial age. See Orley 
Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 273·77 (1995) (finding no effect from age); Sisk et al., 
supra note 53, at 1459·60 (finding no significant effect of age). 
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had a differential impact, in the presence of particular attitudinal or 
institutional variables. 
* * *  
In the end, the data analysis of Gay Rights and American Law 
clearly demonstrates that attitudinal factors, institutional factors, the 
law, and additional factors all matter in judicial outcomes. Rather than 
pitting these theories of decisionmaking against one another, research 
should focus upon how they interact. The law was clearly the most 
important factor in intermediate appellate courts.68 By contrast, the 
law was the least important factor for courts of last resort.69 Other 
intersections of the law with other variables were not clearly tested. 
For example, it would be valuable to know if the judicial selection 
method of a state appeared to influence the significance of legal 
precedent as a variable. The wealth of findings contained in the study 
still did not address many crucial questions. 
Another addition to these results would be a consideration of case 
outcomes. Pinello tested individual judge votes, but not overall case 
outcomes, in order to avoid a risk known as the ecological fallacy.70 
Yet it is outcomes, and not votes, that ultimately matter. A judge's 
vote cast in dissent is not of the same significance as a swing vote, so 
outcomes should also be considered. Consider a panel of nine judges, 
five of whom are conservative and four liberal. Suppose that all vote 
as expected, except for one conservative who casts a liberal vote. 
While ideology would have predicted eight of the nine votes (88% 
accuracy), the ultimate outcome would be contrary to that predicted 
by the ideological variable. The possible presence of peer effects also 
demonstrates the need for additional analysis focused on case 
outcomes rather than individual judicial votes. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS 
The results found in Gay Rights and American Law are certainly 
intriguing as factual matters, but their ultimate importance lies in how 
they can inform political and judicial decisions. Pinello, a 
straightforward empiricist, presents relatively little analysis of 
68. See p. 154 (noting that the legal variables improved the model's predictive abilities 
by thirty percent in such courts, while other factors improved its abilities by seventeen to 
twenty percent). 
69. See p. 154 (In these courts, the legal variables improved the model's predictive 
ability by only twelve percent.). 
70. The classic discussion of this fallacy is found at W.S. Robinson, Ecological 
Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, 15 AM. Soc. REV. 351 (1950). 
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leaving it to the reader to draw his or her 
This Section addresses some of the most 
A. Judicial Selection 
The role of the Senate in the selection of federal judges continues 
to be a controversial one, and we are currently embroiled in a vigorous 
political dispute over the ideological screening of judges during the 
confirmation process.71 Senator Hatch has declared himself 
heartened to read the scores of editorials all across this country that have 
addressed the notion of injecting ideology into the judicial confirmation 
process, because this notion has been near universally rejected - except, 
of course, for a handful of well paid, special interest liberal lobbyists in 
Washington, and a few other diehards.72 
The issue is not so clear cut, though. When Clinton was appointing 
judges, Republican Senators declared that it was "perfectly legitimate 
to vote against someone for a lifetime appointment based 
on ideology."73 
Before looking to the Senate's role, it is crucial to realize that 
presidents, to varying degrees, have historically nominated judges 
based on their "political and ideological compatibility."74 Presidents 
overwhelmingly select nominees from their own party and there is 
considerable anecdotal evidence of presidential screening of nominees 
for ideology.75 This presidential screening occurs outside the public 
view, though, and the controversy has swirled around the Senate's use 
of attitudinal screening during its confirmation process.76 There is 
now a "widespread view . . . that it is improper or unseemly to 
71. See Helen Dewar, Polarized Politics, Confirmation Chaos, WASH. POST, May 11 ,  
2003, at  A5 (referring to the "Senate's almost daily round of accusations and acrimony over 
the selection of federal judges"). 
72. 149 CONG. REC. S1928, S1932 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2003) (remarks of Senator Hatch). 
73. Paul Gigot, GOP Mulls Fighting Bill's Dread Judges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1997, at 
Al4; see also Albert R. Hunt, Editorial, Symmetry in Judicial Nominations, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 20, 2003, at A13 (noting that during the Clinton Administration, Trent Lott "left no 
doubt that it was ideology that prompted his objections to . . .  prospective judges"). 
74. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS 2 (rev. ed. 1999); see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 619, 620 (2003) (reporting that "[e]very President in American history, to a greater or 
lesser extent, has chosen federal judges, in part, based on their ideology"). 
75. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 153 (reviewing this evidence) .  
76. See Charles M.  Cameron et  al., Senate Voting on  Supreme Court Nominees: A 
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 525, 530 (1990) (reporting that Senate voting 
is "decisively affected" by ideology); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for 
the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 927 (1979) (finding 
that policy disagreement was primary cause of votes against nominees in fourteen 
controversial appointments). 
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inquire into a judicial candidate's substantive legal views" at the 
appointment stage.77 
The politicization of judicial selection has been often lamented as 
divisive and discouraging the nomination of especially able candidates. 
Bruce Fein contended that it produced a "Court of mediocrity," 
yielding only unobjectionable judges.78 Because the confirmation 
process may screen out the controversial, it allegedly produces justices 
of lower "stature" than in the past.79 Senatorial concern for ideology 
allegedly will detract from concern about quality.80 Stephen Carter has 
written extensively on the "mess" that is the contemporary process of 
confirmation for Supreme Court justices and its adverse effects.81 
While the nomination process has been criticized for various types of 
attacks on nominee character, a central concern has been their 
ideological focus.82 Some argue that Senate confirmation processes are 
too intrusive into the attitudinal predispositions of nominees for the 
federal courts. An advocate of judicial independence argued that 
nominees who declined to respond to Senate questioning "were right 
to send overly inquisitive senators packing."83 
One central difficulty with the criticism that confirmation 
questioning undermines judicial quality is the inability to define the 
"quality" that we wish to find in our judges. Judicial quality "is said to 
include temperament, expertise, integrity, intelligence, training, and 
77. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out the Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 
549, 552 (1995). 
78. Bruce Fein, A Court of Mediocrity, AB.A. J., October 1991, at 75. 
79. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW PoLmcs OF SUPREME 
COURT CONFIRMATIONS 162-63 (1994) (suggesting that the current confirmation process 
would not yield a Frankfurter or a Holmes or a Brandeis or a Marshall). 
80. See Hearings on the Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process Before the 
Subcomm. On Administrative Oversight of the Sen. Comm on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 234 
(June 26, 2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Ronald Cass) (contending that "the 
effort to check nominees' views compromises the Senate's ability to check nominees' legal 
competence and temperament"). 
81. See Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 185 (1988); 
Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 962 (1990) 
[hereinafter Carter, The Confirmation Mess, Revisited]; Stephen L. Carter, Why the 
Confirmation Process Can 't Be Fixed, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Carter, Why the 
Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed]; Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 
Continued, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (1993). 
82 See Hearings, supra note 80, at 13 (statement of Senator Kyl) (criticizing ideological 
considerations in judicial confirmation); id. at 23 (statement of Lloyd Cutler) (declaring that 
treating judges as ideology is wrong as "a matter of political science" and weakens public 
confidence in the courts); id. at 51 (statement of Stephen Presser) (arguing that Senate 
should not use ideology in evaluating judicial nominees). 
83. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 67 (2003). 
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communication skills."84 These attributes are obviously amorphous 
and difficult to define in the abstract, much less apply to particular 
candidates. None of those who criticize the confirmation process have 
come up with clearly defined standards for judicial quality or even 
examples of potential quality judges who failed the nominating 
process (or low-quality judges who passed the process). Absent such 
an understanding, there is no basis for the claim that ideological 
screening has a cost in judicial quality. 
Carter argues that questioning judicial candidates on factors 
relating to their likely future decisions "represents a profound threat 
to judicial independence."85 If Senators were seeking some binding 
advance commitment on judicial votes, that might be contrary to 
judicial independence,86 but they are not doing so. They are simply 
seeking a prediction of how a judge will rule on an issue on which the 
legal materials are not dispositive. Nothing about judicial 
independence implies that judges, once appointed, should have 
unfettered rein to exercise their personal ideological proclivities about 
the proper path of the law. The criticism erroneously conflates 
extracting promises on particularized future votes with investigating 
generalized ideological proclivities relevant to future votes.87 The two 
are quite different, and the illegitimacy of the former does not speak 
to the illegitimacy of the latter.88 
84. Cross, supra note 15, at 1537-38; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: 
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 257 (1988) (noting that 
"[d]evising a useful definition of judicial competence seems elusive; even if such a definition 
existed, the question would remain whether such differences really matter in determining 
outcomes"). 
85. Carter, The Confirmation Mess Revisited, supra note 81, at 965. 
86. See Paulsen, supra note 77, at 573 (making the distinction that the "political 
branches may demand information necessary to enable them to make informed predictions, 
but they may not extract promises or pledges"). 
87. See Hearings, supra note 80, at 169 (statement of Ronald Rotunda) (declaring "it is 
wrong for a nominee to promise to vote a certain way" and leaping excessively to the 
conclusion that "consideration of ideology should not be over the table, under the table, or 
through the table"). 
88. Michael Stokes Paulsen explains this more thoroughly and effectively turns the 
tables on those who object to such questioning: 
To exact a promise from a nominee as to how she would vote on future cases or issues is to 
leverage the pre-appointment political process forward in time, past the point of the vesting 
of the judicial commission, and to attempt thereby to "control" how a sitting judge decides 
cases. That is improper, and no judicial candidate of character could properly agree to such a 
process or make such commitments. But those (like Carter) who are fond of invoking 
"judicial independence" make an equal and opposite mistake: To bar inquiry into a 
nominee's substantive views is to attempt to leverage post-appointment judicial 
independence backward in time, prior to the vesting of the commission, and thereby to limit 
how the President and the Senate may exercise their respective constitutional powers with 
respect to appointments. That, I submit, is just as improper. 
Paulsen, supra note 77, at 572-73. 
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Indeed, the evidence makes the case for much more specific 
questioning about particular legal controversies. The consensus view is 
that nominees may be asked about their "judicial philosophies" but 
not about particular legal controversies. Unfortunately, this approach 
is going to yield "virtually no useful information. "89 While it is 
unreasonable to ask a nominee how he or she would vote on a 
particular set of case facts, more abstract questioning can still be quite 
specific. A nominee might well be asked about his or her views on 
particular legal disputes, such as the constitutional propriety of Roe v. 
Wade or Buckley v. Valeo. The answer would not commit the life­
tenured candidate to any particular future decision but would inform 
the Senate on how they would inevitably employ their ideological 
predispositions in future cases.90 
Carter accurately identifies the rationale for judicial screening 
when he observes that "[w]e have all been seduced . . .  into the vision 
of the Justices as creators of policy."91 This seduction can't have 
required much effort, though, because the justices are quite plainly 
creators of policy, and their policy choices are typically driven by their 
attitudinal predispositions. Pinello's research and the research of many 
others clearly demonstrates this descriptive fact. Carter apparently 
wishes to pretend the judicial world were otherwise, as many others 
do, but wishing doesn't make it so. Until judges eschew their 
attitudinal inclinations (which is extraordinarily unlikely and probably 
impossible), policy screening for judges is a logical sequela, as 
Carter realizes.92 
With respect to concerns for judicial quality, confirmation battles 
would only have the potential to harm such quality if Presidents were 
otherwise using an accurate measure of "legal quality" as the standard 
for their own nominating choices. The historical record does not bear 
out this condition. Presidents have used numerous criteria in making 
judicial appointments, of which judicial quality is one but not the 
paramount criterion.93 As noted above, Presidents have historically 
89. Hearings, supra note 80, at 93 (statement of Eugene Volokh). 
90. See Hearings, supra note 80, at 94 (statement of Cass Sunstein) (noting the Senate's 
need to determine whether a nominee is a "Kennedy-O'Connor type" or a "Thomas-Scalia" 
type or a "Harlan type" justice). 
91. Carter, Why the Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed, supra note 81, at 6. 
92. Id. (noting that if judges create policy, "we naturally want to know, before granting 
them life tenure, precisely what policies they are likely to create"). 
93. For an extensive review of the selection process, see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING 
FEDERAL JUDGES (1997). Goldman refers to the "tension between patronage, merit, and 
ideological considerations," and how it will differ among administrations. Id. at 363. He 
notes that the process has become increasingly partisan. Id. The "connection between 
judicial appointments and the administration's policy agenda" was clear in the Reagan years, 
when it became a central political issue. Id. at 302. 
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used an ideological screen for nominations. President Clinton 
confessed to using a belief in privacy rights as a litmus test condition 
on his nominations.94 President Bush clearly uses judicial nominations 
to advance his ideological views.95 If the President is not using judicial 
quality as a standard for nomination, but instead is using ideological 
qualifications,96 there is no reason why the Senate should be held to a 
different standard.97 
The arguments against ideological screening by the Senate and the 
effect on judicial quality are generally conclusory and, at best, 
anecdotal. One study has evaluated the effect somewhat more 
rigorously.98 The author first surveyed scholars (of law and political 
science) to produce an evaluation of the relative quality of Supreme 
Court justices. The level of confirmation battles and associated 
nominee scrutiny developed only in the late 1960s. There was no 
difference in estimated quality for the justices appointed after that 
time,99 though none of the recent justices approached the standard for 
"greatness" reached by some of the earlier justices.100 Perhaps the 
confirmation process does impede the selection of "greatness," though 
this finding may have simply been due to the fact that perceptions of 
greatness appear only after time. In any event, the perceived 
"greatness" of Justices like Holmes and Brandeis may not be 
attributable to their traditional legal skills. 
Nor is it clear that open attitudinal evaluations of nominees would 
exacerbate the "confirmation mess." Much of that mess involves 
scrutiny into personal matters, such as FICA tax payments for 
nannies, allegations of sexual harassment, or marijuana smoking. 
94. Carter, Why the Confirmation Process Can't Be Fixed, supra note 81, at 2. 
95. See, e.g. , Hunt, supra note 73 (observing that while "the president accuses 
Democrats of playing politics . . . he nominates almost nothing but pro-life judges and 
passionate activists of a conservative stripe"). 
96. Presidents have employed a minimum standard of competence to screen out the 
most "questionable" nominees for the bench, but a large number of candidates remain to be 
selected on other criteria. See LA WREN CE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT, 42-43 (7th ed. 
2001). 
97. See Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23 (arguing 
that "[w]hatever factors a president may properly consider, senators should also consider"). 
The purported confirmation mess, viewed historically, may be primarily due to increased 
politicization of appointments by presidents. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Judicial 
Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 15, 40 (2002) 
(suggesting that "war" breaks out in the confirmation process "when national political 
leaders, particularly presidents," break norms regarding ideological selection). 
98. Michael Comiskey, The Senate Conformation Process and the "Quality" of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices in the Twentieth Century (presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
Midwestern Political Science Association, Apr. 3-6, 2003) (on file with author), available at 
http:/larchive.allacademic .com/publication/prol_index.php. 
99. Id. at 15-19. 
100. Id. at 25. 
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Senator Schumer has reported that the "unwillingness to openly 
examine ideology has sometimes led Senators who oppose a nominee 
to seek out nonideological disqualifying factors, like small financial 
improprieties from long ago, to justify their opposition," which led to 
"an escalating war of 'gotcha' politics" that warped the confirmation 
process.101 A more transparent focus on nominee ideology would seem 
more honest and less messy.102 
Even if the adversarial Senate confirmation did have the effect of 
somehow reducing the "legal quality" of the judiciary, that outcome 
would not delegitimate the inquiries. Pinello's research and ample 
other research shows that legal quality represents only a fragment of 
decisionmaking. Legal quality matters least on supreme courts, for 
which the attitudinal model is the best predictor of outcomes, perhaps 
because the courts take cases without clear legal answers. Even if 
intrusive questioning had some negative effect on legal quality, such a 
result by itself does not make the case against ideological questioning. 
The results of Pinello's study are of interest in the context of 
selecting federal judges. They suggest reason for concern for ethnic 
and religious diversity on the courts.103 It would be troubling if 
religious affiliation or some other attitudinal attribute of a judicial 
nominee were to be considered disqualifying. It would also be 
irrational to take this approach. Pinello's data reveal tendencies, not 
inevitabilities, and some members of every group rendered decisions 
for gay rights (or against). Pinello himself opposes any use of "litmus 
tests" for nominees (p. 161). In the case of individual nominees, 
though, knowledge of Pinello's results might warrant some specific 
questioning. It would be enormously controversial to question a judge 
about the role that his or her religion might play in decisionmaking. 
However, if religion in fact plays such a role, as Pinello finds, the 
question would seem to be a perfectly legitimate one that should be 
asked. Judges have no logical claim to be free from scrutiny on matters 
that may drive their votes. 
The importance of attitudinal variables and need for scrutiny of 
nominees is countered somewhat by Pinello's findings on precedent. 
He shows that judges will, as they should, vote contrary to their 
preferences in the face of a clear precedent. However, many cases are 
not governed by such clear precedents and leave considerable play for 
extralegal considerations. Moreover, all precedents were at one time 
101. Hearings, supra note 80, at 2. 
102 See id. at 39 (statement of Laurence Tribe) (discussing that issue was "surfacing 
and making a specific matter of inquiry out of something that is otherwise shadowy and in 
the closet and sub rosa . . .  that is often an excuse for character assassination"). 
103. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in 
the New Millenium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597 (2003) (arguing this case). 
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the product of a judicial resolution of a case of first impression. As 
might be expected, Pinello's results show that attitudinal variables are 
enormously important in such cases. Judicial selection screening is 
centrally important to determining the path of precedents that will 
control judicial decisions in the future. His results also show that even 
ideological judges will follow those clear precedents, once set. 
While the conventional wisdom is that the judicial nomination and 
appointment process is overly politicized, the truth may be the 
opposite. News is made when the Senate filibusters or refuses to hold 
hearings for a judicial nominee but not when other nominees breeze 
through the process. During the six years when Clinton was President 
and Republicans had a Senatorial majority, over 375 judges were 
confirmed.104 In about two years of the Bush Administration, 124 
judicial nominees won Senatorial approval.105 Only a minority of 
appointments have been blocked for ideological reasons. Pinello's 
findings demonstrate that not only extreme ideologues on the bench 
that render attitudinal decisions but that this tendency is 
commonplace in federal courts, at least on gay rights issues. The 
results suggest that · participants in the process should do more 
ideological screening, not less. Gay rights is the one area where such 
screening is appropriate. 
B. Federal Courts 
The legal academy has seen a longstanding debate over the 
comparative merits of federal and state courts, especially in the 
contest of human rights claims. Scholars have often argued that 
federal courts offer a preferred forum for rights claims. The widely 
cited classic of the genre is The Myth of Parity.106 This influential 
article contended that state courts were institutionally less competent 
or less favorable to claims seeking the vindication of individual rights. 
The article was influential and continues to be used in support of a 
federal forum.107 Most practitioners seem to concur with the 
article's conclusions.108 
104. Dewar, supra note 71. 
105. Id. 
106. Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
107. See, e.g. , Evan Tsen Lee, On the Received Wisdom in Federal Courts, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1111  (1999) (making the theoretical case for the federal forum); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 84 (reviewing the debate). 
108. See Chemerinsky, supra note 84, at 269 (reporting that a majority of rights 
attorneys believed federal courts were more favorable than state courts); Rubenstein, supra 
note 36, at 599 ("Get a group of civil rights lawyers together and there is at least one thing 
they would agree upon - they prefer to litigate in federal, not state, court."). 
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For many, the U.S. federal courts are a bastion of individual rights 
protection, defending such liberties from the attempted depredations 
of the majority, as reflected in the nonjudicial government branches. 
Federal judges, because they are free from electoral concerns, may be 
regarded as resistant to the pressures for majoritarian discrimination 
and both able and willing to protect the interests of disenfranchised 
minorities.109 Logically, it might seem that the institutional setting of 
the federal judiciary better conduces to protecting individual rights. 
While theoretically appealing, the historical "record does not 
support the assertion that judicial review has been a force for 
protecting individual liberties."110 Indeed, the "Court frequently has 
declined to intervene when this paradigm calls for judicial 
involvement."111 The Court has shown no systemic interest in 
protecting the rights of discrete and insular minorities.112 Under the 
traditional theory, state judges, who typically must stand for election 
and many of whom are engaged in partisan elections, would be far 
inferior to federal courts when it comes to protecting individual 
liberties. Yet if federal judges have not been so protective of 
individual liberty as predicted, perhaps the theory is unfair to 
state judges. 
The debate over federal versus state courts has also been 
influenced by notions of judicial independence. Federal judges, of 
course, have life tenure and other constitutional provisions, such as 
salary protection, to ensure their independence. The picture in the 
states varies considerably, but most state judges serve limited terms 
and must run in some sort of reelection campaign. The consequent 
expectation is that federal judges should be more independent of 
public op1mon, campaign contributors, and other politicians. 
Consequently, they might be expected to provide greater succor to the 
rights claims of minorities and less receptive to the interests of the 
state.113 Justice Brennan argued that independent courts can pass 
109. This is the classic view captured in the infamous Carotene Products footnote, that 
the judiciary deploys the Fourteenth Amendment in the interests of discrete and insular 
minorities. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
110. LOUIS FlSHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 63 (1988). 
111 .  Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 145, 153 (1998) (referring specifically to the detention of Japanese-Americans during 
World War II and speech restrictions during World War I and the Cold War with the 
U.S.S.R.). 
112 See L.A. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197 
(1994) (reviewing Court's history in applying the now-infamous Carotene Products 
footnote). 
113. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic 
Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 
329, 333 (1988) (questioning whether one can reasonably expect elected state judges to be 
impartial in cases challenging the constitutionality of state action). Of course, the empirical 
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"sober constitutional judgment" at times when elected officials are 
influenced by the "passions and exigencies of the moment. "114 
As noted above, life-tenured, seemingly independent federal 
judges have not been consistently employed such sober constitutional 
judgment in defense of minority rights. Even if independence gives the 
judiciary the theoretical ability to protect individual rights, it provides 
no inducement for judges to do so. Nor have elected politicians been 
consistently unsupportive of minority rights. In reality, elected 
majoritarian officials have been quite supportive of minority rights. 
Elected officials must attend to the policy preferences of even their 
minority constituents, and even the majority of the people may prefer 
the protection of the rights of minoritiesY5 Indeed, the historical 
record contains ample evidence that elected officials can be more 
protective of such rights than the courts.116 Judges subject to election 
may have an electoral reason to be concerned for gay 
rights protection.117 
If elected legislators and executives are protective of minority 
rights, one might expect elected state judges to be likewise. Some 
evidence has called into question the purported superiority of federal 
courts in rights protection. A study of constitutional decisions found 
relatively little difference in outcomes between state and federal 
courts.118 A study of takings claims found similar comparability.119 The 
empirical data of this study showed a clear cut advantage for state 
courts in gay rights claims. The state advantage was all the more 
remarkable, once case facts were considered. Some case facts are less 
favorable to the success of gay rights claims, including the family 
issues. Although "state courts adjudicated appreciably more cases with 
topics predisposed to lose than federal courts did," the state courts 
evidence, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text, shows that elected judges have been 
more willing to declare state statutes unconstitutional, which demonstrates the importance 
of empirical testing of such seemingly logical theories. 
114. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
115. See Cross, supra note 15, at 1562-67 (analyzing these and other reasons why 
majorities will be protective of minority rights). 
116. See id. at 1564 (observing that "civil rights is an area in which the elected branches 
have been far more vigorous and protective than have the courts"); id. at 1570-73 (reviewing 
the historical record of majoritarian rights protection more broadly). 
117. See Rubenstein, supra note 36, at 619-21 (noting that such judges may be concerned 
with attracting gay voters, will tend to associate local political groups including gay bar 
associations, and have a higher turnover rate). 
118. Michael Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983) 
(finding no difference in criminal actions and a modest federal advantage in civil 
constitutional claims). 
119. See Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State 
and Lower Federal Court Interpretation of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 283-85 (1999). 
May 2005] Gay Politics 1215 
"still substantially outperformed [federal courts] in securing minority 
rights" (p. 116; emphasis omitted). 
Pinello also emphasized the pragmatic importance of filings in 
state courts, given the issues central to gay rights. Only 22 % of the 
cases that arose in his sample arose in federal courts, and only 35.5% 
of these issues raised federal questions of any type (p. 101). Some of 
the most important issues were family matters to be resolved in state 
court using state standards. Of course, a certain federal ruling under 
the Equal _Protection Clause could have an enormous impact on state 
courts and state standards. Given the unlikelihood of such a dramatic 
ruling, though, the state issues may be paramount, and the state courts 
have been more receptive to gay rights claims. Legal scholarship on 
gay rights might benefit from greater attention to state courts. 
Pinello's findings have implications beyond gay rights. While gay 
rights issues are not representative of all litigation, neither are they sui 
generis. Gay rights claims surely share much in common with claims 
brought by other minority groups that are disdained by a large portion 
of the public. While further research is needed on the litigation of 
other groups, the book's results suggest that state courts might also be 
a preferred forum for their claims. Pinello concluded that "neither 
presidential appointment nor life tenure of federal judges necessarily 
improves the probability that their policy making will be more 
favorable to disfranchised minorities than that of state counterparts 
selected by other methods or for shorter terms of office" (p. 1 13; 
emphasis omitted). 
Justice Brennan's call for the use of state constitutions and courts 
to protect individual rights is the classic that stands in counterpoint to 
The Myth of Parity.12° Brennan foretold the fate of individual rights 
claims in the post-Warren Court era and argued that state courts could 
be used to enhance the protection of such liberties when the federal 
forum was unfavorable. There is some generalized evidence that state 
courts have taken up this role.121 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues 
that empirical evidence can never conclusively resolve the state versus 
120. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
121. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law 
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1066-67 (1995) 
(addressing cases where state courts have found that their constitutions provided greater 
rights protection than provided by federal courts under the federal constitution). State 
courts have distinctly increased their role since Brennan's article was written. See Ronald 
K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation 
Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 601 (1986) (noting that the 
1980s saw an increased use of independent state constitutional grounds for rulings). 
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federal forum dispute.122 While this is surely correct, empirical 
information is essential to an informed analysis of the dispute, and 
Pinello's results add considerable ammunition to those who defend 
reliance on the state, not the federal, forum for advancing such claims. 
C. Precedents 
Descriptively, the most important social scientific finding of the 
book may be the evidence on precedents. Pinello's results show that 
"rumors of stare decisis's death have been greatly exaggerated" and 
that integrated models "reveal that stare decisis is statistically 
significant with consequential impact statistics" (p. 143). He has 
rigorously proved what law professors were saying all along - legal 
precedents matter. Pinello also demonstrated, though, that precedents 
were not the only variable that mattered in judicial decisions. The 
multiple determinants for judicial votes must be analyzed for 
practical implications. 
The results of Gay Rights and American Law are best viewed as a 
first step in a long journey to understanding the significance of 
precedents. These findings are an enormously important first step, 
because they set us on the path of appreciating the potential 
significance of precedent, but much remains to be explored. While 
Pinello's analysis of precedent is a considerable advance over prior 
quantitative analyses, it is still overly simplistic. He transformed the 
presence of precedent into a binary variable when in reality the 
binding effect of precedent lies along a continuum. The coding had a 
fairly rigorous standard for identifying a precedent and did not enable 
an answer to questions about its diffusion. For example, does a 
precedent on gay rights in employment affect decisions on gay rights 
in family matters? Does a generalized privacy precedent affect 
subsequent gay rights claims? Pinello's powerful results for precedent 
may simply be due to his rigorous standard for identifying precedents. 
While the quantitative empirical analysis of the book offers 
considerable advances in understanding the role of precedent, the 
reader might also like some narratives on precedent to illuminate our 
understanding. Such narratives might tell us much more about how 
precedent matters. Considering the narratives (or "the trees") is vital 
to finding theories for empirical testing and uncovering the best 
approach to operationalize such testing in order to discern the broader 
picture ("the forest"). For example, one might wonder why precedents 
were not followed in some cases. How did the judges in these cases 
distinguish these precedents? Did the courts of last resort expressly 
122 See Chemerinsky, supra note 84, at 256 (referring to the matter as an 
"unanswerable empirical question," because there is no clear standard for comparison of the 
quality of the results from state and federal courts). 
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overrule those precedents? Were older precedents less likely to be 
followed? Did the nature of the language of the precedents have an 
effect on whether they were followed in subsequent holdings? The 
answer to these questions may be critical in understanding the 
operation of the law. 
The study of precedents is but a subset of the study of the effect of 
law on judicial decisionmaking, and Pinello examined other aspects of 
legal decisionmaking as well. His empirical results also suggest that 
constitutional text matters in court. While the legal importance of 
constitutional language is commonly presumed, the reality is that 
courts have not hewed closely to such language. The Supreme Court 
has recognized a broad privacy right in the federal constitution, even 
though such a right is absent from its text. A comparative study of 
constitutional language is possible at the state level, because some 
states contain express privacy rights in their constitutions, while others 
do not. Pinello found that the presence of such an express privacy 
clause had a positive and significant effect on the success of gay rights 
claims (p. 114). As with the research on precedent, this finding shows 
that judging is more than a simply application of attitudinal 
proclivities and that the law itself matters. 
Pinello's research adds to the understanding of legal precedent and 
how it governs. As noted above, the most remarkable and interesting 
finding of the research involves the varying power of negative and 
positive precedents. While Pinello does not discuss this effect, I 
suspect that the reason for this finding lies in the Bickelian impulses of 
the judiciary. Because judges are typically regarded as 
countermajoritarian, at least at some level, they may be abashed in the 
aggressive pursuit of lawmaking.123 Life-tenured federal judges might 
especially feel this constraint. State courts, bearing the democratic 
imprimatur of elections and consequently possessing their own 
constituencies, might be less Bickelian in deference and more assertive 
in rights protection. 
While my Bickelian theory is but a hypothesis, it finds some 
support in Pinello's data. He found that a pro-gay rights judicial 
decision was less likely in a state that prohibited consensual sodomy 
but more like'Iy in a state that had passed a gay civil rights law (p. 80). 
This finding is consistent with the suggestion that judges fear being on 
the cutting edge of societal change but are more willing to take action 
once other institutions have signaled that they find such change 
acceptable. Pinello also found that judges with prior service in 
nonjudicial elective government were less likely to favor gay rights 
123. Alexander Bickel suggested that judicial review should be exercised cautiously 
because the judiciary is not majoritarian. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 16-23 (2d ed. 1986). 
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and "deferred to other branches for innovative government action."124 
This is consistent with the theory that generalized deference plays a 
role, as is the fact that an elected (and therefore more political) 
judiciary is somewhat more supportive of gay rights claims. The more 
aggressive, rights protective role of state judiciaries also provides 
confirming evidence. 
One final implication of Pinello's research involves strategic 
litigation. 125 The value of the strategically selected "test case" is 
important to the path of future law.126 One key to the successful test 
case is strategic forum shopping, which indicates that litigants should 
work at the state level and consider the state's cultural environment as 
well as individual judge attributes before pressing ahead. As precedent 
is important, a losing claim will have negative externalities on the 
prospects for success in actions brought by other future litigants. 
Pinello's model could correctly predict the outcome of over eighty 
percent of the federal court decisions opposing gay rights (p. 103). 
Some of these cases surely represented unwise litigation that 
undermined the prospects for future gay rights litigation. Litigants and 
particularly interest groups need to be informed about their prospects 
for successful results and shun cases likely to yield negative 
precedents, while remaining alert to opportunities for setting a 
positive precedent (based on institutional and attitudinal variables), 
which in tum could demonstrably enhance the success of 
future claims.127 
III. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
The publication of Pinello's book barely predates the recent 
federal Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, striking down 
124. P. 91.  The theory may also be supported by the findings on elected judges. 
Appointed, life-tenured judges of the federal judiciary have a "limited and constrained 
authority," while broader plenary judicial authority may be a "necessary incident of an 
elected judiciary." Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the 
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1888 (2001). This different context could explain 
why federal judges were more reluctant to take the initiative in upholding gay rights claims, 
in contrast to the more assertive state courts. 
125. See, e.g. , Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5-
8 (2000) (discussing how strategic litigation can alter the path of precedent); Cross, supra 
note 43, at 366-68 (same). 
126. The test-case strategy has been used effectively in other civil rights contexts. See, 
e.g. , Amy Leigh Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the A CLU Women's 
Rights Project, 11  TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 157 (2002) (discussing test cases in advancing 
women's rights); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, 20 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 97 (2002) (discussing use of test cases in fight against racial segregation). 
127. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 173 (arguing that understanding the determinants of 
judicial decisionmaking is important to "enable parties and their advocates to become more 
sophisticated participants in the judicial enterprise"). 
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the Texas state law against homosexual sodomy.128 Given the 
coincidental timing, it is interesting to examine the Lawrence decision 
in the context of the book's findings. Some caution is warranted in this 
analysis. Statistical analyses do not purport to explain every decision 
but only seek to identify patterns in the data. As a lone decision, 
Lawrence provides only anecdotal evidence that cannot confirm or 
refute a much broader quantitative statistical analysis.129 As a Supreme 
Court decision, of course, Lawrence is viewed as being far more 
important than other decisions, but its relative importance will depend 
in large part on the controlling power of precedent and future cases in 
which it is cited, in ways analyzed by the book. 
At first blush, it may appear that the ruling in Lawrence is contrary 
to what Pinello might have expected. That decision expressly 
overruled the recently decided Bowers v. Hardwick, the votes of which 
were included in Pinello's data, which outcome may seem contrary to 
the precedential findings of Gay Rights and the Law. The pro-gay 
rights finding is also contrary to the general pattern of federal court 
hostility to gay rights claims. The book acknowledges the 
exceptionalism of the Supreme Court and how its patterns may apply 
differently in that context (pp. 100-01). 
In a number of ways, though, Lawrence is consistent with Pinello's 
findings and helps illustrate the significance of his conclusions and 
recommendations. First, the ruling emphasizes the significance of 
ideology, particularly on courts of last resort. Lawrence was a 
fundamentally ideological ruling.13° Although Republican appointees 
joined the gay rights majority in Lawrence, they were the moderate 
Republican appointees. The most conservative justices, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Rehnquist, all dissented. And the moderate Republicans, 
at least Kennedy and Souter, are on the Court only because of 
senatorial vigor in screening out more conservative nominees, 
which illustrates the great significance of the judicial selection 
discussion above. 
Of course, Pinello's book demonstrates that judicial 
decisionmaking is not "mere politics,'' in his evidence on the effect of 
legal precedent. The Lawrence decision is not so contrary to these 
findings as it might first seem. Recall that Pinello found a relatively 
128. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
129. See p. 101 (noting that the fact that "exceptions exist does not disprove the findings 
but merely reinforces the reality that probabilities never predict behavior absolutely"). 
130. See Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 
1 17 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111 (2003) ("[S]uch rulings are primarily ideological and . . .  
constitutional adjudication does not actually proceed on the assumption that law and politics 
are mutually exclusive . . . .  [Rather,] courts conceive politics as the medium within which, 
and out of which, they construct law.") 
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weak precedential effect from anti-gay rights rulings (like Bowers) and 
a strong effect only for rulings in favor of gay rights. He also found 
that courts of last resort were less bound by precedent. Thus, one 
would not expect Bowers to necessarily control future decisions, as 
negative precedent suppressed liberal court of last resort votes only 
27.3% of the time in Pinello's study. Conversely, one might expect 
Lawrence to have considerable precedential power, as positive vertical 
precedent suppressed conservative votes more than 70% of the time 
(p. 139). The most important effect of this decision, though, may be in 
how broadly it can be interpreted. Lawrence has already been invoked 
in Massachusetts to strike down policies that denied marriage to 
gays.131 The precedential power of the Supreme Court case is not 
automatic, though, and an Arizona court reached the opposite 
conclusion.132 The precedential power of Lawrence will vary in future 
rulings, probably according to the variables that Pinello analyzed. 
Most gay rights decisions raise no federal issue whatsoever, though, so 
the state court strategy remains an important one, even after the gay 
rights success in Lawrence. 
The individual justice votes in Lawrence are also roughly 
consistent with the data. One must be cautious in using broad patterns 
to project decisions of individual U.S. Supreme Court justices, because 
the screening process for nomination to the Court is far from a 
random selection. Justice Thomas, for example, may not be 
representative of the broader pattern of minority sentiment. 
Notwithstanding this caveat, the votes are consistent with some of the 
broad patterns. Justice ideology largely predicted the division of votes. 
The decision showed an evolution over time in the direction of 
favoring gay rights. The female justices fav01;ed the gay rights claim. 
The two Jewish justices (Breyer and Ginsburg) both favored the claim. 
Two of the three Catholic justices (Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy) 
opposed the gray rights claim. Of the four Protestant justices 
(O'Connor, Rehnquist, Souter and Stevens), two joined the majority, 
one concurred and one dissented. The results are roughly consistent 
with the book's data and expectations. 
The data also coincide with some other predictions. The presence 
of amici on behalf of the gay rights claim may also have been a 
significant factor. In addition to gay rights groups, the American 
Psychological Association, the American Bar Association, and other 
groups, including religious groups, urged that the anti-sodomy law be 
struck down. The book demonstrates the significance of such amicus 
support, which surely played a part in the Supreme Court decision. 
131. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
132. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
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Although Lawrence was but a single data point, its outcome is 
illuminated by the research of Gay Rights and American Law. 
Ultimately, one should not rely on statistical analyses of all courts 
to make predictions about a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Considerable empirical evidence demonstrates that controversial 
Supreme Court decisions are determined almost exclusively by judicial 
ideology.133 The statistical evidence may bear more directly on 
consideration of the implications of the Lawrence decision. Pinello's 
findings suggest that Lawrence will be more powerful in support of gay 
rights claims than Bowers was to the contrary. The Lawrence decision 
is not invulnerable, though, and its fate will depend in some part on 
future judicial selections. The precedential power of Lawrence will 
also depend on the circumstances of the cases and judges who hear 
future gay rights claims that rely on Lawrence. Pinello's research is a 
valuable tool for projecting which of those future claims is most likely 
to succeed. 
IV. CODA ON LEGAL RESEARCH 
One of the most compelling stories surrounding Gay Rights and the 
Law is its window into legal research practice. Traditional legal 
research has not made great use of quantitative methods that are 
common to other academic fields. While such quantitative empirical 
legal research is increasing, it remains a small fragment of the body of 
legal research. 
Additional empirical research is vital to a full understanding of the 
operation of the law in America. Other disciplines recognize the value 
of rigorous quantitative analyses. Where would we be if medicine 
based its decisions on anecdotal reports of patients whose condition 
improved following the administration of a drug and failed to conduct 
sophisticated quantitative analyses of drug safety and effectiveness? 
Would we want our economic policies to be based on reports of 
isolated companies' success rather than an overall quantitative picture 
of economic patterns? The law is every bit as important as medicine 
and the economy, and it deserves the same caliber of research method. 
A. The Importance of Quantitative Empirical Research on Gay Rights 
Recent years have seen considerable, high quality conventional 
legal research on gay rights law. Much of this research has dwelt on 
the debate over the proper legal "hook" for the recognition of gay 
rights, e.g., use of privacy principles, equal protection principles, or 
133. See, e.g. , JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
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otherwise.134 In this vein, Andrew Koppelman has argued that 
constitutional privacy claims are a weak basis for gay rights claims, so 
that advocates should look to other legal arguments.135 Others have 
questioned the power of the sex discrimination basis for such claims.136 
This debate is very well reasoned, from a traditional legal perspective, 
but cries out for supplementation in the form of empirical analyses of 
these claims. The goal of all these authors is to find an effective hook 
for gay rights claims, and the proof of their arguments must lie in 
the empirical pudding. Pinello's analysis informs the discussion of 
these claims. 
Patricia Cain has written a long narrative story of gay rights 
litigation.137 Her story covers fifty years of litigation in support of such 
rights and clearly informs our understanding of the legal situation for 
gay rights claims. However, without the rigor of empirical analysis, 
such an approach may mislead. Her focus on a few big cases, such as 
Bowers v. Hardwick, paints a picture that has been described as 
"bleak."138 Pinello's broader empirical research suggests that the 
reality is not so unpromising. As discussed above, any such reliance on 
narratives risks undue emphasis on particular trees, while losing sight 
of the broader forest. 
Pinello is not the only researcher examining the empirical success 
of gay rights claims. William Rubenstein examined the extent to which 
gay rights laws produced state employment discrimination claims.139 
He found that the laws were used with some frequency and had some 
effect, contrary to the suspicions of some.140 This empirical information 
is essential to a rational and effective analysis of the effects of 
litigation. Quantitative analyses on gay rights litigation can clarify the 
relative effectiveness of various strategic paths. 
134. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal 
Foundation for Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (discussing the various possible 
claims); Jonathan Pickhardt, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights 
Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1998) (discussing and questioning the strength 
of legal claims based on the presumption that homosexuality is not a personal choice). 
135. See Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy?, 2002 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 105; 
Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
136. See, e.g. , Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001). 
137. See PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LA WYERS AND COURTS 
IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000). 
138. Shayna S. Cook, Finding Gold in the Rainbow Rights Movement, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1419, 1419 (2001). 
139. William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical Assessment, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (2001). 
140. Id. at 68. 
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While additional research could inform legal argumentation in 
support of gay rights, one inevitably suspects that the fate of such 
rights lies more in the composition of the judiciary than in creative 
legal arguments. As Koppelman concedes, "[t]he courts have 
enormous discretion in deciding whether gays are protected by the 
right to privacy, the right to marry, or the right against animus," and 
"[ e ]ven the strongest legal arguments do not guarantee success. "141 
Pinello's book demonstrates the factual truth of this conclusion. 
However, Koppelman may go on to go too far when he suggests that 
the "thought of homosexuality can still drive the judicial mind into 
desperate confusion. "142 While there are certainly examples of such 
confusion, the evidence presented by Pinello suggests that this is not 
commonplace. Rather, the success of gay rights claims depends on the 
concatenation of attitudinal, institutional, and traditional legal factors. 
The circumstances in which gay rights claims prevail are fairly 
predictable, and Pinello concludes that "lesbian and gay reformers 
reasonably can invest hope in a litigative struggle" (p. 151). 
B. The Strangely Negative Reaction to Quantitative Empirical 
Research 
Given the importance of quantitative empirical research, the 
resistance to such research by the legal academy is both odd and 
unfortunate. In virtually every other field of academic research, 
quantitative measures are the gold standard for the discovery of 
descriptive truth. For legal academics, truth is commonly tested 
through case analyses. While these may be informative, reliance on 
the approach runs into obvious problems that are alleviated through 
quantitative methods. 
While this is not the place for a full discourse on statistics, one 
aspect of quantitative empirical study needs to be understood. Just 
like more typical legal research, statistics is about drawing inferences 
from data. Unlike the amorphous standards of typical legal research, 
though, statistics has some logical rules that give much greater 
confidence that the inferences are valid.143 First, accepted quantitative 
practice requires a certain minimum number of data points. Just as 
one would not draw conclusions about Barry Bonds's batting based on 
his success in a single game or series, one should not draw conclusions 
141. Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 
2058 (2000). 
142. Id. 
143. See, e.g. , Epstein & King, supra note 4 (containing a much longer discussion of the 
importance of these inferential rules). 
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about the law based on a very limited number of cases.144 Second, 
accepted quantitative practice demands that the data points be 'chosen 
randomly (from whatever larger . set is relevant).145 Much legal 
research, including some of the best legal research, openly involves 
subjective case selection in argumentation. The cases selected may not 
be representative and raise the suspicion that they are influenced, 
consciously or unconsciously, by the researcher's own biases.146 
Different authors commonly reach diametrically opposite conclusions 
from the same basic data.147 While this is understandable in the context 
of normative arguments grounded in different values,148 it is hard to 
justify in the context of descriptive research. Third, accepted 
quantitative practice demands transparent and disciplined procedures 
for analyzing that data.149 Without such transparency and rigor, the 
reader cannot know if the researcher considered all the relevant 
factors and in a reasonable manner. 
The legal academy's undue reliance on unrepresentative anecdotes 
and failure to adhere to principled rules of inference has arisen in the 
judicial selection debate. Professor Rotunda, for example, emphasizes 
Scalia votes in favor of a Fourth Amendment plaintiff and on flag 
burning as evidence that the justices are not ideological.150 Yet a point 
is not proved by choosing two votes out of the hundreds cast by the 
justice. Such reliance on isolated anecdotes look like a desperate effort 
to cling to a fantasy, in light of the much more extensive empirical 
studies demonstrating that, on balance, judicial ideology makes a 
difference. Dean Cass maintains that the "evidence supporting the 
ideology argument is remarkably weak."151 Given the dozens of studies 
demonstrating some statistically significant effect for ideology, this 
144. See id. at 70-71 (discussing the need to "[e]xtract as [m]any [o]bservable 
[i]mplications as [p]ossible" in order to have confidence in findings); id. at 102-03 (urging 
researchers to "[c]ollect as [m]uch [d]ata as [f]easible"). 
145. See id. at 108-12 (discussing the need for this procedure in order to avoid a 
� selection bias that could skew the results). 
146. While there are obvious opportunities for investigator bias to appear in 
quantitative empirical research as well, the rigor of that procedure reduces the opportunities 
for severe bias to creep into the results. 
147. See, e.g. , Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 83 (noting that reliability requires "the 
same results . . .  regardless of who or what is . . .  doing the measuring"). 
148. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154-57 (2002) (noting that some legal research centers 
on normative argumentation that is distinct from the descriptive research governed by the 
rules of inference). 
149. See, e.g. , Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 38 (stressing that good empirical work 
should be replicable in that "another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, 
build on, and reproduce the research"). 
150. See Hearings, supra note 80, at 173. 
151. See id. at 231. 
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claim is remarkable. None of those studies are referenced, though, by 
Dean Cass, who does not even acknowledge their existence. It is fair 
to debate the conclusions of those studies but it is hard to justify 
ignoring them. Professor Chemerinsky has taken the more empirically 
defensible position that "ideology should be considered because 
ideology matters" and "a person's ideology influences how he or she 
will vote on important issues."152 His claim could be more persuasive, 
though, had he used or at least referenced the considerable body of 
data that demonstrates the point. 
Despite the value of quantitative empirical methods, legal 
academics have shied away from their use. Deborah Hensler has 
observed that lawyers, academics, and judges have all shown some 
level of "indifference or hostility to empirical research on ADR."153 
Perhaps this is attributable to the "basic distaste to be found among 
many students of law for any other than their own traditional 
language."154 The negative reaction has even produced a "tendency to 
exclude scholars with divergent perspectives from scholarly 
conferences and other academic interchanges."155 Those of the law 
have "generally reacted with hostility to [empirical] attitudinal 
literature" on the grounds that it reflects "an overly-crude picture of 
judicial decisionmaking."156 While there is something to this criticism, 
it should not provoke hostility, it should instead provoke law 
professors to undertake their own searching and rigorous analyses to 
refine the literature and identify whatever measure of truth it may 
contain. Quantitative research has its own inevitable limitations in 
legal analysis and can be overly reductionist. It must be supplemented 
by more qualitative analyses, but quantitative research remains a vital 
tool for understanding the law. 
The preparation of Gay Rights and American Law includes a 
valuable experience in the conduct of empirical research and the 
reactions of law professors that is described in the book. Much of the 
information necessary for coding judges' backgrounds is readily 
available from public sources, but Pinello was unable to identify the 
religious affiliation for some of the judges in his database. He sent a 
survey to judges to ascertain information about their background, 
including their religious affiliations, and received· · answers from 
152. Chemerinsky, supra note 74, at 627. 
153. Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP, RESOL. 71, 76, 
154. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION 29 (2002), 
155, Id. 
156. Merrill, supra note 3, at 591; see also SHAPIRO & SWEET, supra note 154, at 40 
(referring to lawyers' "general distaste for statistical examination of judicial attitudes and 
voting"). 
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around two-thirds of the judges, a very good return rate for such 
research (p. 214) 
In order to ascertain information on religious affiliation for other 
judges, he posted an email message to a listserve for law professors 
(LA WPROF), asking members if they could give him this 
information. His request produced a measure of criticism, with law 
professors responding that this was "a private matter," or "none of 
your business" (pp. 156-57). There was an air of hostility in the 
reaction by law professors. Although Pinello had taken precautions to 
protect the privacy of individual judges and there was no reason to 
believe that his inquiry invaded reasonable expectations of privacy, 
the privacy concern was repeatedly raised.157 Perhaps the expressed 
privacy concerns were in fact masking a broader concern about 
the research. 
No one responding to the inquiry expressly objected to the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of judicial decisions in principle, 
but many of the law professors seemed distinctly uneasy about the 
process. 158 One poster particularly disagreed with the notion "that we 
ought to discover what we can about the privately held religious 
beliefs of judges so we can consider whether the statistical tendency of 
persons with similar beliefs to rule for or against groups with which we 
sympathize should lead us to favor or oppose their selection" (p. 160) . 
Unfortunately, this disagreement came with no further reasoning, so 
one is left wondering why we ought not discover this fact. I suspect 
that it is either (a) a general discomfort with empirical analysis among 
legal academics or (b) a fear of discovering facts that, while true, are 
discomfiting. Many of us would prefer to pretend that background 
characteristics, especially religion, are not determinants of 
judicial decisions. 
While legal academics appear somewhat leery of quantitative 
empirical research on courts, some federal judges have been 
downright hostile to the methodology. Judge Edwards has referred to 
some such research as "absurd,"159 "odd, if not bizarre," 
157. Pp. 155-60. As it turned out, Pinello received only one response with sufficient 
information on a judge's religious affiliation to be used in his analysis. E-mail from Daniel R. 
Pinello to Frank B. Cross (June 19, 2003). 
158. Pinello suggested that some law professors seemed to question "the merit of 
quantitative empirical research in the first place." P. 161. In fairness, many law professors, 
including myself, spoke up in favor of this inquiry. But the fact that some opposed the study 
has some significance. See p. 155 (noting that similar posting to list of political science 
professors yielded no objections). 
159. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D. C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1337 (1998). Edwards was responding specifically to Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) and 
Cross & Tiller, supra note 23. 
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"embarrassing[]," and "shockingly ill-reasoned."160 Judge Wald was 
less vituperative but equally aggressive in her attack on this 
research.161 Relatively few judges objected to the conduct of Pinello's 
research, as evidenced by his high return rate. A few, however, 
characterized his research as "irrelevant" or "offensive."162 One New 
York judge went further, writing to the author: 
I fail to understand how the race, religious affiliation, or political party 
affiliation can possibly have any relevance or bearing upon what you 
characterize as a "scholarly journal article involving one or more 
decisions by our court." I am equally troubled by your inclusion of race 
and religion as part of the biography of a judge. 163 
After Pinello wrote this judge a follow up letter, containing references 
to the published literature on decisionmaking, the judge responded: 
I respond to your letter of and in so doing, reaffirm my 
disagreement and displeasure with your premise that the decisions of 
judges are related to and influenced by "political party affiliation, 
gender, religion, race, generational cohort and so forth . . . .  
Notwithstanding all of the sundry sources to which you make reference, 
the judges in this State, and particularly in this region, have by their oath 
of office sworn to uphold the constitutions of the United States and the 
State of New York, and in practice, dedicated to equal and impartial 
justice for all. Your obvious bent that judges in our courts favor those of 
the same faith, national origin, race, or political persuasion is offensive to 
every concept of equality, fairness and justice which we are sworn to 
uphold and strive to provide.164 
While the aspirations of this response are noble, two of its features are 
vivid. First is the cavalier dismissal of the "sundry sources," which 
were empirical articles, without any attempt to grapple on the merits 
with the result. Second is the refusal to participate in a study question. 
Pinello's research, after all, might have demonstrated that attitudinal 
variables like race and religion did not impact judicial decisionmaking. 
The judge in question perhaps feared that Pinello would find results 
such as those he did. 
One should not make too much of this single response, because the 
vast majority of judges participated in Pinello's survey without 
objection. The judiciary is not generally attentive to or concerned 
about political science research, though. It is when such studies are 
160. Edwards, supra note 159, at 1356, 1357, 1367. 
161. See Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 
(1999). 
162. E-mail from Daniel R. Pinello to Frank B. Cross (June 19, 2003). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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produced in the legal literature by legal academics that judges have 
become exercised.165 It was law review articles to which Judges Wald 
and Edwards vigorously responded. The foundation of the judicial 
concern about the empirical research is obvious, as Judge Edwards 
worried about the "contemporary climate of skepticism towards 
courts."166 Judge Edwards' fear is that the research may "mislead the 
unsuspecting . . .  into thinking that judges are . . .  influenced more by 
personal ideology than legal principles. "167 
The judicial concern for appearances is certainly understandable, 
but it cannot deny descriptive reality. For litigants, including gay rights 
litigants, it is the reality of outcomes that matters rather than 
appearances. Furthermore, appearances inevitably follow reality at 
some distance, as the truth can be obscured only so long. In fact, 
empirical research will not be so demeaning to the judicial enterprise 
as may be feared. While some political scientists have suggested that 
judicial decisionmaking is utterly political and that the law is 
meaningless, much of the best recent research demonstrates that the 
law does have a profound effect on judicial decisions, which Pinello's 
research confirms. This research should bolster our appreciation for 
the role of the law, though it is unlikely to support the traditional 
formalistic vision of the law. 
It should be clear from the existing research that law's effect is not 
so simple and straightforward as may be taught in first-year law school 
classes. Studies like Pinello's are necessary to illuminate how, when, 
where and why law matters in judicial decisions. The determining role 
of law cannot be merely assumed. Relying on such assumptions about 
the law and the power of precedent merely leaves legal academics 
without persuasive ammunition when other disciplines present 
rigorous empirical analyses that appear to demonstrate that law does 
not matter. Quantitative analyses, such as that of Pinello, show that in 
fact the law does matter, but not in the simple formalistic manner that 
some legal academics assume. Empirical legal research is growing but 
remains at an embryonic level.168 
Much vital research on judicial decisionmaking remains to be 
done, and it should be performed by, or in collaboration with, law 
165. See Patricia M. Wald, Scholars in the Arena: Some Thoughts on Better Bridge 
Building, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 355, 357 (2003) (discussing how judges are familiar with law 
reviews but lack the time to familiarize themselves with social scientific research).  
166. Edwards, supra note 159, at 1336. 
167. Id. at 1337. 
168. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities 
and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033 (lamenting underdeveloped state of empirical 
research on contract law). 
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professors and published in legal journals.169 I have suggested above 
some intriguing questions posed but not answered by Pinello's data. 
One huge lacuna in the existing empirical research involves the 
significance of the language of opinions. The existing empirical 
research has focused overwhelmingly on judicial outcomes alone (e.g., 
which party prevailed), without examining the judicial language that 
set precedents for future rulings. This may be because outcomes are 
much more easily captured as a quantitative variable or perhaps 
because many of the political scientists doing the research don't 
believe that such precedential language matters. However, reliance on 
simple outcome coding can miss crucial legal developments. Outcome 
coding would treat Roe and Casey as identical, because both were 
rulings in favor of abortion rights. Lawyers of course know that the 
two decisions were not at all identical in their real-world implications. 
If "what judges say is even more important than how they vote,"170 
then research needs to move beyond simple outcome coding and 
attend to the importance of the content of opinions. By capturing such 
differences, law professors could greatly enhance the understanding of 
law. To have real persuasive impact, though, this research would 
require analytical rigor, such as that offered by the methods of 
quantitative empiricism. Simply citing anecdotal cases isn't enough. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of Pinello's empirical analysis are both intriguing and 
important. They illuminate and inform key legal controversies. There 
is a dispute in the legal academy between the significance of legal 
realism and legal formalism as determinants of judicial outcomes. 
Social scientists have weighed in strongly on the side of the realists. 
Both sides of this controversy have made exaggerated claims about 
the irrelevance of the others' claims. 
Pinello's results provide no succor to either extreme. He finds clear 
evidence that both the law and politics matter, in substantial measure. 
Those who wish to entirely isolate the law from politics, eschewing 
political considerations in judicial selection in hopes of pure 
professionalization of the judiciary, are pursuing a vain aim. Judicial 
backgrounds, including political affiliations, are an important part of 
decisionmaking outcomes and it is willfully blind to attempt to ignore 
or evade that well-established descriptive fact. However, attitudinal 
169. See, e.g. , Epstein, et al., supra note 45, at 817 (discussing need for collaboration and 
exchange between law and political science in research); Cross, supra note 2, at 321 
(discussing the need for legal academics to participate in empirical research on judicial 
decisionmaking). 
170. SHAPIRO & SWEET, supra note 154, at 98. 
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politics is not destiny, and Pinello provides considerable evidence that 
the law itself matters greatly in outcomes. Judges will moderate or 
even negate their personal preferences in the presence of contrary 
legal commands. Rather than conflicting, the realism and legal 
frameworks interact with one another cybernetically,171 a relationship 
that requires much further research. Only when this association is 
understood can we truly understand the workings of the legal system. 
Gay Rights and the Law contains relatively little normative content 
(aside from the author's occasional asides) and focuses on the 
descriptive determinants of decisions, but results such as these have 
substantial normative implications. The recognition that attitudes and 
institutional factors influence decisions is critical to judicial selection 
and the institutions that influence judicial decisionmaking. The Pinello 
results might also be important to the state/federal court question. 
They demonstrate the superiority of state courts for gay rights litigants 
and provide some basis for an implication that this superiority may be 
more general. Although the Lawrence decision may alter this 
conclusion, it bears noting that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
that case was much slower to come than many comparable state court 
decisions in favor of gay rights. The results should illuminate the 
efforts of advocates to extend and apply the ruling in Lawrence. 
Finally, Gay Rights and the Law is important to all further research 
on the law, as conducted by both legal academics and by social 
scientists. For academics, the most significant findings may be those 
regarding the significance of precedent. The book substantially 
informs our understanding of judicial decisionmaking but leaves many 
other questions unanswered. While traditional legal research may shed 
light on the answers to these questions, quantitative empirical 
investigation is necessary for a confident understanding of judicial 
behavior. Legal academics should not shun such analyses but should 
embrace them as central to the mission of legal research. While the 
use of quantitative empirical methods in legal research is growing, far 
too much research ignores such methods and the results of prior 
quantitative empirical studies. Professors of law should strive to 
improve, not evade, quantitative empirical legal studies. 
171. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 171 (emphasizing that the "relationship between 
objective legal rules and subjective pre-judicial experiences reflects synergy as well as 
conflict"). 
